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Confronting Testimonial Hearsay: Understanding the
New Confrontation Clause
Judge DanielB. Shanes*

INTRODUCTION

In 2004, the United States Supreme Court rewrote its understanding
of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause1 in Crawford v.
Washington,2 jettisoning a quarter-century of "reliability" jurisprudence
in favor of a new testimonial/non-testimonial analysis. In doing so, the
Supreme Court affected seismic change in the landscape of nearly every
criminal trial in Illinois and across the United States. At its core,
Crawford holds that when a hearsay declarant does not testify at trial,
the Confrontation Clause prohibits admitting the declarant's testimonial
statements unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a
3
prior opportunity to cross-examine.
Even though the Supreme Court revisited the subject two years later
in Davis v. Washington,4 many questions remain, leaving some courts
scratching their heads. Courts today are looking at various formulae to
identify testimonial hearsay. Among the issues pressing courts are: (1)
what degree of governmental involvement in procuring a statement is
necessary to render that statement testimonial; 5 (2) whether a
statement's testimonial status is properly determined by its content or
the context in which it is made; 6 and (3) identifying the relationship
* Hon. Daniel B. Shanes is a Judge of the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Lake County, Illinois. Before joining the bench, he served as an Assistant State's Attorney for
nearly twelve years and previously as a judicial law clerk to Justice Robert J. Steigmann of the
Illinois Appellate Court. Judge Shanes is a graduate of the DePaul University College of Law,
where he was a member of the DePaul Law Review.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("[Iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right..
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. Id. at 68.

4. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
5. See infra Part I (discussing how much governmental involvement is necessary to make a
statement testimonial).
6. See infra Part I (analyzing how the context of a statement, and not its content, renders it
testimonial).
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between the High Court's new understanding of the Confrontation
Clause and its Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.7 This
Article examines and illuminates each of these issues in turn.
I. GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT: SIR WALTER RALEIGH FINALLY
8
CARRIES THE DAY

The first issue concerns how much governmental involvement in
obtaining the hearsay statement is necessary before the statement can be
deemed testimonial. This Part addresses that question by analyzing the
historical foundations of the Confrontation Clause, 9 Supreme Court
jurisprudence, 10 and Illinois case law,1 1 concluding that some level of
government involvement is necessary to render a statement testimonial
12
and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause.
A. The Origins of the Confrontation Clause
Understanding the Confrontation Clause, and the level of government
involvement necessary to implicate it, necessarily begins with a quick
review of the clause's origins. In the course of identifying testimonial
hearsay as the object of the Clause's protection, the Crawford Court
repeatedly focused upon "the historical background of the Clause to
understand its meaning." 13 The Court explained:
[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. It was these
practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like
Raleigh's; that the Marian statutes invited; that English law's assertion
of a right to confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the

7. See infra Part III(examining how the Court's understanding of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments affect its new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
8. An earlier version of this section originally appeared as Daniel B. Shanes, The Crawford
Confrontation-ClauseBar: Governmental Involvement Is Key to "Testimonial" Hearsay, 96 ILL.

B.J. 574 (2008).
9. See infra Part L.A (discussing the historical origins of the Confrontation Clause).
10. See infra Part I.B-E (examining recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions which address the
Confrontation Clause).
11. See infra Part I.F (analyzing Illinois courts' treatment of the Confrontation Clause in the
wake of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
12.

See infra Part I.G.

13. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004). In its earliest case interpreting the
Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he primary object of... [the Clause] was
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases,
being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). Crawford brought the Clause back
home to its roots.
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founding-era rhetoric decried. 14The Sixth Amendment must be
interpretedwith this focus in mind.
Both Crawford and Davis discussed Sir Walter Raleigh's trial
extensively. 15 In Raleigh's time, government investigators (then
variously called magistrates or justices of the peace) took witness
statements for use in prosecution in lieu of in-court trial testimony. 16 In
Raleigh's trial, one such witness was an alleged co-conspirator, Lord
Cobham, who implicated Raleigh in an examination before the Privy
Council and in a written letter. 17 These statements ultimately were read
to the jury. Suspecting Cobham would recant, Raleigh demanded that
Cobham appear so that he could confront "my accuser before my
face." 18 The judges refused, the jury convicted, and Raleigh was
ultimately executed.19
Crawford identifies Raleigh's case as "a paradigmatic confrontation
violation." 20 The Davis Court noted that Cobham's statements were
used as "a weaker substitute for live testimony at trial. '2 1 In other
words, Cobham's out-of-court statements-formal declarations
procured by the government-were used in lieu of his in-court
testimony to convict Raleigh. Understanding the Sixth Amendment
"with this focus in mind" 22 makes clear that this practice of "trial by
affidavit" is the Confrontation Clause's primary concern. A recurring
theme throughout Crawford and Davis, Raleigh's case serves as an
excellent illustration of the kind of evidence that constitutes testimonial
hearsay.
B. TestimonialHearsayDescribed
While the Court holds up Cobham's statements as the prime example
of the kind of testimonial hearsay the Confrontation Clause was
designed to prohibit, the Court's understanding of what constitutes
testimonial hearsay is revealed more by description than definition.
Crawford declares that testimonial hearsay is a "specific type of out-of14. Crawford,541 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
15. See id. at 44 (citing Raleigh's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603)); see also Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006). To be sure, the Crawford Court discussed other historical
cases as well.
16. Crawford,541 U.S. at 53.
17. Id. at 44 (citing Raleigh's Case, 2 How. St. Tr., at 15-16 (1603)).
18. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 52.
21. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S.

387, 394 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
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court statement" 23 that triggers the Confrontation Clause because it is
"hearsay [that] consists of ex parte testimony." 24 Providing some
description of what constitutes testimonial hearsay, Crawfordand Davis
also clearly identify various types of hearsay that are not testimonial. In
the end, it is the qualitative differences between those various out-ofcourt statements that distinguish testimonial from non-testimonial
evidence.
As a starting point, Crawfordholds that testimonial evidence includes
prior testimony and statements made during certain police
interrogations. 25 The Court noted that prior testimony can come from a
variety of settings, including past trials, hearings, grand jury
proceedings, plea allocutions, depositions, and affidavits. 26 These
sworn or in-court statements include a significant degree of formality
and governmental involvement, if from nothing more than placing the
declarant under oath.
The Court deems such statements plainly
27
testimonial.
In Crawford, the Court noted that, by its own terms, the
Confrontation Clause applies to "witnesses" against the accused.2 8 The
Court construed "witnesses" as those who bear testimony. 29 "An
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
30
acquaintance does not."
Comparing the practices of sixteenth century England to modem
procedures, the Crawford Court concluded that the "involvement of
government officers in the production of testimonial evidence presents
the same risk [of violating the Confrontation Clause], whether the
officers are police or justices of the peace." 3 1 This is because "police
interrogations bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of
32
the peace in England.

23. Id. at 51.
24. Id. at 60. See also Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (holding that "statements under official
interrogation [are testimonial as they] are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they
do precisely what a witness does on direct examination").
25. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
26. Id. at51.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 53.
32. Id. at 52.
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Accordingly, in addition to sworn statements, Crawford concluded
that testimonial hearsay can also be produced during certain unsworn
police interrogations. 3 3 Exploring the circumstances in which such
statements yield testimonial hearsay, the Davis Court emphasized the
government's purpose in obtaining out-of-court evidentiary statements
for use in a later criminal prosecution as a defining factor that makes the
statement testimonial.3 4 The use of such "ex parte examinations" at
trial smacks of the very practice the Confrontation Clause was designed
35
to prevent.
The Supreme Court further explored the contours of testimonial
hearsay by explaining what types of out-of-court statements are not
testimonial hearsay. 36 Crawford specifically held that statements
covered by most hearsay exceptions by their nature are not testimonial,
mentioning business records and co-conspirator statements as but two
37
examples.
While most hearsay-exception statements do not seem to have much
in common, they are all similar in that none of them share the
characteristics of testimonial hearsay. By their very definitions, their
primary purpose is not to establish facts for a later criminal prosecution,
and they are typically not made to the police. Indeed, many times no
governmental actor is involved at all. In other words, they bear little
resemblance to the evidence used to prosecute Sir Walter Raleigh. As
such, declarants making statements that fall within most hearsay
exceptions simply are not acting as "witnesses" within the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause; such statements do not constitute "ex parte
testimony." 38 As a result, these statements do not constitute testimonial
hearsay.

33. Id.

34. As the Court explained:
Statements are non[-]testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). See also infra Part ll.B.
35. Crawford,541 U.S. at 50.
36. See id. at 56 (citing business records or statements in furtherance of conspiracy as
examples of non-testimonial hearsay).
Chief Justice Rehnquist's separate opinion further mentioned spontaneous
37. Id.
declarations, statements made in the course of procuring medical treatment, dying declarations,
"and countless other hearsay exceptions." Id. at 74 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
38. Id. at 60.
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C. Bourjaily v. United States and Dutton v. Evans

Understanding hearsay-exception evidence as outside the definition
of testimonial hearsay comports with the Crawford Court's
characterization of statements addressed in two prior Supreme Court
cases, Bourjaily v. United States39 and Dutton v. Evans,40 as "clearly
non-testimonial."'4 1 A quick examination of those cases illustrates the

comparison between hearsay-exception evidence and testimonial
statements and shows why Crawford easily deems the hearsay
statements in Bourjaily and Dutton non-testimonial.
In Bourjaily, the trial court admitted a co-conspirator's statement to

an undercover government agent pursuant to the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule. 42 As part of that ruling, the trial court had
determined that the statements were made in furtherance of the

conspiracy (rather than, for example, made post-arrest during structured
police questioning). On review, the Supreme Court held that admitting
those statements did not offend the Confrontation Clause. 43 In both
Crawford and Davis, the Court reaffirmed that conclusion, declaring

44
without discussion that those statements were not testimonial.

In Dutton, the trial court admitted statements of a co-defendant

implicating the defendant to a third prisoner while they were all in jail.45
The Supreme Court affirmed admitting those statements as coconspirator statements (despite the fact that the declarant and the others

were already in custody for those offenses). 46 As in Bourjaily, the
Court in Crawford and Davis summarily declared those statements
clearly not testimonial.4 7
The Court deemed the statements in Bourjaily and Dutton clearly
non-testimonial because they were neither solemn declarations, nor
39. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
40. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
41. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 (2006).
42. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 173-74.
43. Id.
at 181.
44. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 (2004); Davis, 547 U.S. at 825. Writing for a
plurality of the Court, Justice Scalia recently again reaffirmed Bourjaily, explaining that the coconspirator statement "did not violate the Confrontation Clause [because] it was not (as an
incriminating statement in furtherance of the conspiracy would probably never be) testimonial."
Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6 (2008).
45. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 77-78.
46. Id. at 87-89. The Court noted that Georgia's statutory co-conspirator hearsay exception
could include statements made to conceal the conspiracy even if co-conspirators were already
being prosecuted. Id. at 78. The statements were made between co-conspirators; no police
interrogation was involved. Id. at 77-78.
47. Davis, 547 U.S. at 825; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58-59.
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were they made to government agents for the purpose of providing
evidence to convict. Indeed, they were quite the opposite. In Bourjaily,
a co-conspirator was making statements to an undercover agent to
further a criminal conspiracy, not for use against the defendant at trial.4 8
49
In Dutton, no government agent was even involved.
In sum, neither statement was obtained by the government for use in
lieu of live testimony at a subsequent trial. Neither declarant was
constitutionally acting as a "witness" or "testifying." Simply put,
neither statement bore any resemblance to the evidence admitted against
Sir Walter Raleigh. As a result, Crawford and Davis easily concluded
50
that these statements were non-testimonial.
This teaching informs the analysis of statements in other contexts as
well. In both Crawford and Davis, the Court made clear that the
Confrontation Clause is aimed at curbing a particular practice: the use at
trial of formalized, ex parte statements made to government officials
investigating an offense. The Crawford Court explained at length that it
is governmental involvement in eliciting the statement which bears the
"closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed. ' 5 1
Without governmental involvement, the concerns
animating the Confrontation Clause are largely absent.
D. White v. Illinois
The Crawford Court's discussion of White v. Illinois52 sheds more
light on the importance of governmental involvement in eliciting a
statement triggering the Confrontation Clause. The Crawford Court
described White as "arguably in tension" with its rule requiring a prior
opportunity
for cross-examination
for proffered
testimonial
statements. 5 3 Crawford's discussion of White pertained to statements of
the child-declarant to an investigating police officer that were admitted
as spontaneous declarations. However, the four-year-old rape victim in
White did not cry out only to the police officer-she did so as well to
her babysitter and mother, and those statements were also admitted as

48. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 174.
49. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 77-78 (summarizing how the statement was made to a fellow inmate).
50. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57; Davis, 547 U.S. at 825.
51. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. This is not to suggest that the declarant must speak directly to a
prosecutor, judge, or law enforcement officer to render a statement testimonial. When a person is
acting as an agent of the government, it is clear that the same "state action" is present as if the
declarant were speaking to the governmental officer directly. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2.
52. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
53. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. The Davis Court repeated this characterization of White.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 825.
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spontaneous declarations. 54 Further, her subsequent statements to both
an emergency room nurse and doctor were admitted 55 pursuant to
Illinois' statutory hearsay exception set forth in section 115-13 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. 56

While noting that admitting the child's statements to the police
officer in White was "arguably" in tension with its holding, the
Crawford Court was deafeningly silent regarding the avalanche of

hearsay testimony from the babysitter, mother, nurse, and doctor in
White.57 The Crawford Court pointedly identified only the statements
to the police officer as "arguably" testimonial hearsay. By not even

mentioning the other statements as even possibly testimonial, the Court
parent,
strongly signaled that all the other statements-to the babysitter,
58

nurse, and doctor-do not constitute testimonial hearsay.

What accounts for singling out the statements to the police officer
from all the others? The obvious difference between the statements to
the police officer and the statements to all the other witnesses is the
The
governmental involvement in procuring those statements.

statements to the babysitter and mother are clearly more akin to
"remark[s] to an acquaintance" 59 that do not constitute testimonial
hearsay. The statements to the nurse and doctor similarly lack the
qualities of a "formal statement to government officers" 60 that is the

54. White, 502 U.S. at 348-50.
55. Id.at350-51.
56. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-13 (2006). Section 115-13 is broader than the common-law
hearsay exception for statements made in the course of medical diagnosis or treatment because
statements of a child sexual assault victim identifying her assailant can be admitted as part of the
hearsay exception. People v. Falaster, 670 N.E.2d 624, 629 (111. 1996); People v. Oehrke, 860
N.E.2d 416, 420-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). Nonetheless, the White Court did not seem to believe
that had any constitutional significance. Compare White, 502 U.S. 346 (admitting statements as
spontaneous declarations), with Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (placing emphasis on firmly
rooted common-law hearsay exceptions rather than statutory hearsay exceptions). Of course,
Crawford overruled Roberts. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 413-14 (2007).
In addition, it is interesting that this distinction did not make a difference to the Crawford
Court's lack of concern regarding admitting the statements to the nurse and doctor. Not only did
the Court avoid identifying the statements to the nurse and doctor as possibly testimonial (in
contrast to the statement to the police officer), the Court was similarly unconcerned that the
content of the statement identified her abuser. See infra Part H1.
App. Ct. 1990) (setting forth in detail the
57. See People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241 (I11.
various hearsay testimony admitted at trial), affid 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
58. The Crawford Court was aware of the existence of the other hearsay evidence, describing
White as having "involved, inter alia, statements of a child victim to an investigating police
officer." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. Nonetheless, it was only the statements to the
investigating police officer that drew the Court's attention while discussing testimonial hearsay.
59. Id. at 51.
60. Id.
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hallmark of testimonial hearsay. Thus, all of those statements are nontestimonial.
Only the statement to the police officer is "arguably" testimonial, and
it is so precisely because it was made to a police officer investigating a
crime. However, that statement was also a spontaneous declaration, and
because statements covered by most hearsay exceptions (such as
spontaneous declarations) are typically not testimonial,6 1 the result in
White is merely "arguably"-and ultimately not-inconsistent with
Crawford.
E. Giles v. California
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Giles v. California,in which the
Court again reflected upon the specific type of out-of-court statement
that triggers the Confrontation Clause-in other words, testimonial
hearsay. 62 In doing so, the Court identified a domestic-violence
victim's statement as "testimony to police officers." 63 Its choice of
language in describing a declarant's out-of-court statement as testimony
to police officers resonates with its analysis in Crawford. It is the
declarant making a formal statement to a governmental agent (i.e.
testimony to police officers) that is necessary to yield testimonial
hearsay.
In addition, Giles reiterated that "only testimonial statements are
excluded by the Confrontation Clause." 64 The Court then importantly
wrote as follows: "Statements to friends and neighbors about abuse and
intimidation, and statements to physicians in the course of receiving
treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules, which are
65
free to adopt the dissent's version of forfeiture by wrongdoing."
What do friends, neighbors, and doctors have in common? None are
governmental actors. Although Giles was focused upon the forfeitureby-wrongdoing doctrine 66 rather than the contours of testimonial
61. Id. at 56. By definition, a spontaneous declaration is a statement made without reflection
in the wake of a startling event; it is the antithesis of a formal statement made in court or to the
police investigating a crime in response to persistent interrogation or structured questioning. See
People v. Williams, 739 N.E.2d 455,479 (Il1. 2000).
62. Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2682-83 (2008).
63. Id. at 2693 (emphasis added).

64. Id. at 2692.
65. Id. at 2692-93. Nor did the dissenters disagree with this analysis. "Where a victim's
statement is not 'testimonial,' perhaps because she made it to a nurse, the statement could come
into evidence under this rule." Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2700 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and
Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
66. The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine permits, under certain circumstances, the

introduction of the out-of-court statements of a declarant who was prevented from testifying at
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evidence,67 the Court clearly reaffirmed the themes animating Crawford
and Davis: without governmental involvement, the concerns animating
the Confrontation Clause are absent.
F. Illinois Case Law
1. Illinois Supreme Court's Recent Analysis
In In re Rolandis G.,68 the Illinois Supreme Court recently added its
voice to the testimonial hearsay discussion. In Rolandis, the juveniledefendant was adjudicated delinquent for the aggravated criminal sexual
assault of a six-year-old boy. Although the victim did not testify, the
trial court admitted various statements he made first to his mother, then
to a child advocate at the local children's advocacy center, 69 and finally
to a police officer pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. 70 Before the Illinois Supreme Court, the parties agreed that
the victim's statements to his mother were not testimonial and that his
statements to the police were; accordingly, the court addressed whether
the boy's
statements to the child advocate constituted testimonial
71
hearsay.
Central to the court's analysis was its determination that the
circumstances in the case "objectively indicate that [the children's
advocate] was acting as an agent of the police and that the primary
purpose of her interview was to establish or prove past events that
would be relevant in a future criminal prosecution." 72 These
considerations flow smoothly from Crawford's understanding of the
role of governmental involvement in testimonial hearsay, as well as

trial by the defendant.
67. The parties assumed, and the Court accepted without deciding, that the statements were
testimonial. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682. However, while concurring with the majority opinion,
Justice Thomas and Justice Alito each wrote separately to note that (despite the fact the declarant

was speaking to a police officer) they did not believe the statements constituted testimonial
hearsay in the first place. Id. at 2694 (Thomas, J., and Alito, J., concurring). See infra Part IL.B
(discussing that statements to police officers are not necessarily testimonial under the Davis
primary-purpose test).
68. In re Rolandis G., No. 99581, 2008 WL 4943446 (Ill. 2008).
69. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1 et seq. (2008) (the Children's Advocacy Center Act)
70. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (2002). Section 115-10 provides that in a prosecution for
various offenses involving physical or sexual acts against a child or mentally disabled individual,
the trial court may, under certain circumstances, admit the child's out-of-court statements
regarding the offense. Id.
71. Rolandis,2008 WL 4943446, at *8.
72. Id. at *9.
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Davis's focus upon the statement's primary purpose. 73 Deciding that
"the interview took place at the behest of the police," 74 the appropriate
inquiry then turned upon whether the circumstances objectively
indicated the statement's primary purpose was for use in resolving an
ongoing emergency or, instead, to establish past events for a later
prosecution. 7 5 Determining that the objective circumstances showed the
statement was to "gather information and establish past acts for future
prosecution," 76 the court's conclusion that it constituted testimonial
hearsay entirely comports with Crawford and Davis and logically
applies their holdings.
77
The court went on to note the plurality opinion in People v. Stechly,
a fractured case in which the seven members of the court filed four
separate opinions. In the primary opinion, the plurality devised a
framework for analyzing potential testimonial hearsay. That framework
looked to whether the statement was made in a solemn fashion and
whether it was intended to establish a particular fact. 78 It then provided
a split test to examine the intent aspect: when a statement is made to the
police or their agent, the intent of the questioner controls. 79 In other
situations, however, the inquiry would be whether a reasonable
declarant could conclude his statement could be used in court against
80
the defendant.
Although the Rolandis court worked through the Stechly analysis, it
clearly would have reached the same result even without this added
layer of construction. First, the issue before the court was deciding the
testimonial status of a statement to a governmental actor; the testimonial
status of a hearsay statement to a non-governmental actor was not
before the court. Accordingly, the Stechly plurality's framework

73. See, e.g., Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. The Court in Davis explained:

Statements are non[-]testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Id. See also infra Part lI.B (discussing Davis and the primary purpose test).
74. Rolandis, 2008 WL 4943446 at *9.
75. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
76. Rolandis, 2008 WL 4943446 at *9.
77. People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333 (111.2007).
78. Id. at 355.

79. Id. at 356-57.
80. Id. at 359.
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regarding statements to non-governmental actors is unnecessary to the
Rolandis court's analysis and holding.
In addition, having determined that (1) the children's advocate was a
governmental agent, and (2) the statements were to establish past events
for a future prosecution, the court appropriately concluded that the
statements constituted testimonial hearsay. Discussing the intent of the
questioner versus declarant was similarly unnecessary; indeed, the
statement constitutes testimonial hearsay either way. No ongoing
emergency existed, and the statements were not intended-by anyoneto be used to resolve a flaring crisis. Instead, objectively viewed, the
statements were clearly intended to establish past acts for future
investigation and prosecution. As a result, they were testimonial. The
additional layer of discussion did not affect the court's decision.
Importantly, while the Stechly discussion goes beyond Crawford,
Davis, and Giles, the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Rolandis
81
remains perfectly consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's teachings.
Following those cases and viewing the facts as the Illinois Supreme
Court did, the statements in Rolandis were testimonial, and the outcome
perfectly comports with Crawford,Davis, and Giles.
Moreover, in support of its holding on the State's forfeiture-bywrongdoing claim, the Rolandis court extensively and approvingly
quoted the United States Supreme Court's declaration in Giles that
"[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation,
and statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment ' 8 2 are
not the types of statements that constitute testimonial hearsay. In doing
so, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized the clear guidance provided
by Giles on the importance of the status of the person to whom the
declarant makes her statement: testimonial hearsay-those statements
subject to the Confrontation Clause--do not include statements to
friends, neighbors, or doctors providing medical services.
2. Illinois Appellate Court Discusses Centrality of Governmental
Involvement
Some courts have noted Crawford's repeated concern regarding the
involvement of government officers in the creation of testimonial
hearsay. The clearest example in Illinois is People v. R.F.83 In that
81. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 (2004) (stating that the Court's
"recent cases, in their outcomes, hew closely to the traditional line"), with id. at 60 (noting that
"the results of our [previous] decisions have generally been faithful to the original meaning of the

Confrontation Clause, [even if] the same cannot be said of our rationales.").
82. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2692-93 (2008).
83. People v. R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287, 295 (I11.
App. Ct. 2005).
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case, a three-year-old girl told her mother, grandmother, and an
investigating police officer that her father sexually assaulted her. At
trial, the child did not testify, but her out-of-court statements were
admitted pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. 84 On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of
these statements as violating the Confrontation Clause.
In a thorough discussion, the appellate court noted that "Crawford
repeatedly emphasized the significance of governmental involvement ' in
85
determining whether a hearsay statement is testimonial.
Accordingly, the court held that "Crawford applies only to statements
made to governmental officials; Crawford does not apply to statements
made to non[-]governmental personnel, such as family members or
86
physicians."
In examining statements taken by police officers, the R.F. court
explained that the testimonial nature of a statement turns upon whether
"the officer involved was acting in an investigative capacity for the
purpose of producing evidence in anticipation of a criminal
prosecution." 87 Although R.F. predated Davis by more than a year, this
analysis is presciently consistent with the Davis primary-purpose test.8 8
Reviewing the facts of the case, the appellate court concluded the
statements to the police were testimonial because the officer was clearly
"acting in an investigative capacity for the purposes of producing
evidence in anticipation of a criminal prosecution when he questioned
[the girl]." '89 At the same time, because the child's statements to her
mother and grandmother "were made to family members and not to
governmental personnel, they were not testimonial." 90
Crawford teaches that the Confrontation Clause is primarily
concerned with government's involvement in the production of
statements used subsequently at trial in lieu of testimony. Davis
emphasizes the formality in speaking to the police that is inherent in
testimonial hearsay. Deeming a patient's statements made to her doctor
during diagnosis and treatment testimonial, for example, ignores these
important lessons.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (2002).
R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287 at 294.
Id. at 295.
Id. (citing People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)).
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287 at 295.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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G. Conclusion: Government Involvement in Testimonial Hearsay

The Davis Court declared that testimonial hearsay exists when "the
ex parte actors and the evidentiary products of the ex parte
91
communication align[] perfectly with their courtroom analogues."
This wholly comports with the Crawford Court's repeated concern
regarding the involvement of government agents in the production of
out-of-court statements intended to be used as "a weaker substitute for
live testimony at trial."92 Testimonial hearsay is created when the
government procures out-of-court statements reflecting later trial
testimony, akin to the evidence used against Sir Walter Raleigh.
For the moment, the full scope of what testimonial hearsay
encompasses remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that
Crawford teaches that government involvement is typically a key
component of testimonial hearsay. 93 "An accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not." 94 In
Giles, the Supreme Court echoed that teaching. A person simply does
not testify to grandparents, friends, doctors, or others. Testimony, as
that term is understood by Crawford, requires a formality and purpose
attendant to sworn or courtroom proceedings or statements made to
police investigating a crime.
Absent governmental involvement in the production of an out-ofcourt statement, courts should pause long and hard before deeming it
testimonial hearsay.
II. TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS: PRIMARY PURPOSE OR PARTICULAR

CONTENT?
Another issue vexing some courts is whether the content of a
statement alone can render it testimonial. Davis teaches that a statement
must be examined by its context to determine whether it is testimonial.
Nonetheless, some courts have followed a content-based--rather than
context-based--approach in discerning testimonial hearsay, examining
what the declarant said rather than the circumstances in which she said
91. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. Justice Alito recently summarized the principle, writing that the
"Confrontation Clause does not apply to out-of-court statements unless it can be said that they are
the equivalent of statements made at trial by 'witnesses'." Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678,
2964 (2008) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
92. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
93. Davis built upon that holding, demonstrating that governmental involvement alone is not a
sufficient condition to render a statement testimonial. See id. at 828.
94. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
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it. This viewpoint concludes that when an otherwise non-testimonial
statement identifies or accuses a particular individual of certain conduct,
that portion of the statement becomes testimonial. This content-based
checkerboard practice is inconsistent with Crawford and Davis.
A. In re T.T.
Creating this segregated-statement approach in Illinois was the 2004
appellate court decision, In re T.T.95 Interestingly, on May 31, 2007,
the Illinois Supreme Court vacated the original T.T opinion.9 6 The
appellate court subsequently filed an identical opinion upon remand
(despite the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening opinion in Davis in
2006), but then withdrew it on January 22, 2008. 97 On May 29, 2008,
the Illinois Supreme Court directed the appellate court to file a modified
opinion, 9 8 which the appellate court did on July 25, 2008. 99 This latest
T.T. opinion retains the segregated-statement discussion from its
original opinion. Also, during T.T.'s unusual appellate travels, other
panels of the appellate court followed its original decision. 100 As a
result, like Lazarus, its analysis has risen from the dead. 10 1
In .T,102 the juvenile-defendant was adjudicated delinquent for the
aggravated criminal sexual assault of a seven-year-old girl. At trial, the
court admitted various statements the victim made to her mother, a
DCFS investigator, police detective, and a doctor. 10 3 On appeal, the
appellate court first concluded that the victim's statements to the police
10 4
detective and DCFS investigator were testimonial.
Turning to analyze the statements made to the doctor, the court then
wrote as follows:
[The doctor] was a member of a child abuse protection unit at the
hospital and had previously testified as an expert witness in child

95. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (I1. App. Ct. 2004), vacated, 866 N.E.2d 1174 (Ill. 2007),
rev'd, 2007 WL 2579869 (withdrawn), vacated, 886 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. 2008), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d
1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
96. In re T.T., 866 N.E.2d 1174 (111.2007).
97. In re T.T., 2007 WL 2579869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
98. In re T.T., 886 N.E.2d 1026 (111. 2008).
99. In re T.T., 892 N.E.2d 1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
100. Of the panels that have followed T.T., they usually simply cited and applied it without
significant independent discussion.
101. Although unlike Lazarus, whose alleged rising was based upon divine power, T.T.'s
analysis ignores higher authority.
102. Because the 2004 T.T. opinion introduced this analysis and has been cited by other
courts, it is cited here as well.
103. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 792-95.
104. Id. at 800-0 1.
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abuse cases. DCFS referred [the victim] to [the doctor] for diagnosis
and evaluation of sexual abuse six months after the alleged assault. At
trial, [the doctor] recounted her physical findings in addition to what
[the victim] told her about where on her body she had been hurt, the
offender's use of a lubricant, the pain, the absence of any blood or
discharge, and the identity of the offender.
We do not find controlling the fact that [the victim's] medical exam
was the result of a referral from DCFS. The record established that
[the victim's] mother failed to take her for any medical treatment or
evaluation after the alleged assault. Moreover, government officials
like police officers commonly take sexual assault victims to the
hospital for treatment and evaluation. We also find unpersuasive
[defendant's] assertion that the relationship between DCFS and [the
doctor] at the time of the examination indicated that she constructively
acted as the government's agent in interrogating [the victim]. [The
doctor's] exam was for a diagnostic purpose, and [the victim's]
statement was the by-product of substantive medical activity.
Although [the doctor] may have been part of a child abuse trauma
team, she was not charged with facilitating the prosecution of the case
against [defendant]. As a medical expert with a professional interest
in a patient's treatment, [the doctor's] primary investment in
cooperating with law enforcement agencies was in facilitating the least
traumatic method of diagnosis and treatment for the alleged victim,
rather than a specific interest in enforcing sexual abuse laws against
[defendant]. In contrast to government officers like the police or
DCFS investigators, medical personnel who treat and diagnose sexual
assault victims do not take on a similar investigatory or prosecutorial
function. Certainly, the medical examination of the victim involves
the collection of evidence for later use at a trial, because the victim's
body and the injuries sustained may provide evidence of the crime.
Moreover, the medical evaluation undoubtedly becomes a component
in the determination by the police, State's Attorney, or DCFS
investigator regarding whether
the alleged assault merits further
105
investigation or prosecution.
This is an excellent analysis, and the appellate court was undoubtedly
correct. But the court should have stopped there.
Instead, the court then inexplicably-and without citation to any
authority-went on to state that the portions of a victim's statements to
medical personnel that identify her assailant are testimonial, while the
balance is not. 10 6 Accordingly, the court examined the content of the
statement, segmenting it into testimonial and non-testimonial portions.

105.
106.

Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
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But this approach ignores Crawford'sfocus on the purpose and scope of
the Confrontation Clause as it pertains to the government's involvement
in producing the evidence. 10 7 In addition, it is not consistent with the
Supreme Court's teachings in Davis.
B. Davis and the Primary Purpose Test
In Davis, the Court brought its understanding of testimonial hearsay
forward, teaching that a statement's testimonial nature is determined not
by its content but rather by its purpose and the circumstances in which it
was made. Davis explored situations in which statements to the police
yield testimonial hearsay. While the Court framed the issue before it as
determining "which police interrogations produce testimony," 10 8 it
provided much greater insight into what constitutes testimonial hearsay
in other unsworn contexts as well.
To determine whether a statement made during police interrogation
(as that term is used for confrontation purposes) constitutes testimonial
hearsay, the Davis Court established a "primary purpose" test:
Statements are non[-]testimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency.
They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
In other words, Davis looks to the "why" and the "when" of the
statement. Is the statement obtained to address a current situation? Or,
is the statement obtained by the government to determine what
happened in the past for use in a future prosecution? Statements made

107. See supra Part I (discussing the role of government involvement in procuring a statement
necessary to render it testimonial hearsay).
108. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
109. Id. (emphasis added). To be sure, Davis held that non-testimonial statements can "evolve
into testimonial statements." Id. at 828 (quoting Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind.
2005)). Using the facts of that case as an example, the Court hypothesized that at some point
during the initially non-testimonial 911 call, the victim's statement may have "become"
testimonial in "later parts of the call." Id. at 829. Through in limine procedures, trial courts can
examine a statement and determine whether it was non-testimonial, or even whether at some point
during the statement it became testimonial. In those situations, "trial courts will recognize the
point at which, for Sixth Amendment purposes, statements in response to interrogations become

testimonial [(for example, interrogation after an emergency ends)]."

Id. (emphasis added).

Courts are not to snip and cut, moving forward and backward within the statement, leaving a
checker-cloth remnant for trial. The analysis follows the chronological continuum, tracking the
statement's primary purpose at the time it was made.
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to deal with ongoing situations-for use in the "now"--are not

testimonial while statements taken by the government to memorialize
past events for use in later proceedings are testimonial.
Davis11o was consolidated before the Supreme Court with Hammon
v. Indiana.1 11 The Court's recitation of the facts in those two cases
reflects that chronological dichotomy of purpose.
In Davis, the

statements at issue were made by a domestic-violence victim calling the
police for help. 112 The statements dealt with an ongoing emergency;
they were for use by police to address an immediate situation.
In Hammon, conversely, the declarant spoke with police while they
investigated the commission of a possible crime. The statements
deliberately recounted past criminal conduct, were made during
"structured police questioning" 113 under sufficiently formal conditions
(in a separate room where the police kept the declarant apart from the

suspect), and culminated in the declarant completing an affidavit
memorializing her statement. Rather than helping to resolve a flaring
emergency, these statements were part of a typical police investigation
into the past commission of a possible crime. 114
The Court concluded that testimonial hearsay is produced when the

primary purpose in obtaining the statement is to provide out-of-court
testimony sufficient to use in lieu of the declarant testifying at trial.1 15
Thus, when "the ex parte actors and the evidentiary products of the ex
parte communication align[] perfectly with their courtroom analogues,"

the statement is testimonial. 116 In other words, such "statements under

official interrogation [are testimonial as they] are an obvious substitute
for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on
1 17
direct examination."

Conversely, when the declarant is not acting as a "witness"--that is,
when the statement is not a solemn declaration or affirmation made for
110. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), enforced sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813 (2006).
111. Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
112. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817-21.
113. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004).
114. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829.
115. Compare id. at 828 (stating that Cobham's statements were used as "a weaker substitute
for live testimony at trial" (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
116. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
117. Id. at 830. As Justice Alito later wrote, the "Confrontation Clause does not apply to outof-court statements unless it can be said that they are the equivalent of statements made at trial by
'witnesses'." Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).
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the purpose of establishing some fact directed at proving the facts of a
past crime to convict the perpetrator--the statement is not
testimonial. 118 As the Court observed,' "[n]o
'witness' goes into court to
1 19
proclaim an emergency and seek help."
By structuring its analysis in this way, the Court specifically did not
look to the content-the "what"-of the statement. Instead, it solely
considered the circumstances in which the statement was made-and
not its substance-as determining whether the statement is testimonial.
Accordingly, the Court held that the all of the declarant's statements in
Hammon were testimonial, whereas the statements at issue in Davis
were not.
Nor did the fact that the declarant in Davis identified her attacker
suggest to the Court that any portion of her statement was testimonial.
During the 911 call, the operator asked the victim to identify her
assailant, which she did. The Court concluded that the mere fact the
declarant identified the offender, even to a governmental agent, 12 ° did
not render the statement testimonial. Indeed, the Court went further and
held that the statement-including the identification of the
defendant-was not testimonial even with the 911 operator's specific
efforts to identify the assailant. 12 1 In doing so, the Court reasoned that
the identity of the assailant is pertinent to the police because they "need
to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the
threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential
victim." 12 2 As a result, Davis's analysis is clearly inconsistent with
T.T.'s word-by-word parsing, and necessarily rejects it.
This analysis comports with Illinois Supreme Court precedent
regarding statements made in the course of medical treatment. In
People v. Falaster,123 the child victim was taken for a forensic medical
examination. 124 The trial court admitted the victim's statement to the
nurse identifying the defendant as her abuser. On appeal, the court held
that the victim's identification of her assailant may be considered by

118. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826.
119. Id. at 828 (internal quotation marks in original).
120. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the 911 operator was a governmental agent
for these purposes. Id. at 823 n.2.
121. Id. at 827.
122. Id. at 833 (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County., 542
U.S. 117, 186 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. 670 N.E.2d 624 (IIl. 1996).
124. In fact, "[t]he victim was taken to [the doctor's] office, accompanied by an assistant
State's Attorney according to the doctor's account, for the sole purpose of bolstering the State's
case against the defendant." Falaster,670 N.E.2d at 631 (Harrison, J., specially concurring).
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medical professionals in forming their diagnosis and treatment plan, and
is therefore admissible.
The Illinois Supreme Court's analysis in Falasteris consistent with
the Davis Court's conclusion that police consider the identity of a
possible assailant when assessing a situation and possible danger.
Although Falasterdid not address the constitutional issue, pursuant to
Davis, statements of identification do not automatically obtain special
status.
Indeed, the facts in Davis itself seem closer to constituting
testimonial hearsay then those of T.T. In Davis, the declarant was
speaking to a (presumed) governmental agent, which is far more akin to
the concerns that animate the Confrontation Clause. In T.T., on the
other hand, the victim was not speaking to a governmental actor but
instead to a doctor in the course of seeking medical diagnosis and
treatment. As the appellate court itself noted, the doctor was "not
charged with facilitating the prosecution of the case against [defendant].
•.. In contrast to government officers.., medical personnel who treat
and diagnose sexual assault victims do not take on a similar
investigatory or prosecutorial function." 125 If the Davis victim's
statements during the 911 call are not testimonial, it seems impossible
that a victim's statements to a doctor could be.
C. Dutton v. Evans and White v. Illinois Redux
12 6
As was the case in Part I, the Supreme Court's treatment of Dutton
and White1 27 in Crawfordand Davis further illustrates its understanding
of what constitutes testimonial hearsay.
In both Crawford and Davis, the Court declared that the Dutton coconspirator's statements were clearly not testimonial. 12 8 Importantly,
like Davis, the out-of-court hearsay statement in Dutton specifically
identified the defendant by name. 129 Nonetheless, even such a blatant
and pejorative identification of an offender 30 did not slow the Supreme
Court from declaring this accusatory statement non-testimonial. The
125. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 803 (I11.
App. Ct. 2004).

126. See supra Part I.B. for further discussion of Dutton.
127. See supra Part I.C. for further discussion of White.
128. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 825 (2006). Despite the fact that co-conspirator statements often identify other members of
the conspiracy, the Court recently reaffirmed that such statements are not testimonial. Giles v.
California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 (2008).
129. The full description actually states: "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex
Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 77 (1970).
130. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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mere fact that an otherwise non-testimonial statement identified the
defendant was constitutionally irrelevant to the Court's determination of
the statement's testimonial status. It simply did not matter.
Factually similar to T.T., White provides further evidence of the
Court's understanding of testimonial hearsay. Recall that in White, a
child declarant made statements to her babysitter, mother, an
investigating police officer, emergency room nurse, and doctor. In each
of those statements, the declarant identified the defendant as her
13 1
abuser.
The CrawfordCourt distinguished the statements to the police officer
from the statements to all the other witnesses during its discussion of
testimonial evidence-but not based upon the content of the
statements. 132 Indeed, the Court did not base any of its analysis on the
content of the statements. The fact that all the statements (including
those made to the police officer) identified the assailant was of no
moment to the Court's discussion of what constituted testimonial
hearsay. The Court took each statement as a whole, rather than
dissecting them into testimonial and non-testimonial parts and, in the
end was entirely unconcerned whether any of the statements identified
the abuser.
Both White and T.T. involved a child victim making statements to
emergency room personnel describing injuries as well as the person
who caused those injuries. In Crawfordand Davis, the Court looked at
the statements in White (and Dutton) in their entirety and concluded that
none of them constituted testimonial hearsay. As such, T.T. and its
segregated-statement approach simply cannot be reconciled with the
Supreme Court's controlling analysis.
D. Conclusion: Context Controls Testimonial Hearsay
Davis makes clear that a statement's testimonial status is determined
by the context in which it was made rather than by any particular
content. The Crawford and Davis Courts' construction of Dutton and
White demonstrate that principle. The Davis primary-purpose test
clearly foreclosed the viability of the T.T. court's analysis. Context
controls, and content is a constitutional non-issue.

131.
132.

White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348-51 (1992).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
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III. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE'S PLACE IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Crawford teaches that government involvement in procuring an outof-court statement is typically a component of testimonial hearsay.
Davis teaches that in evaluating the government's actions, courts should
determine the primary purpose of the statement. In these ways, the
Supreme Court has introduced new concepts to its Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.
But these concepts are hardly novel in other areas of constitutional
law. This Part examines the ways in which Fourth and Fifth
Amendment concepts inform the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. Specifically, this Part addresses: (1) whether Crawford's
focus on governmental involvement in testimonial hearsay is akin to a
Fourth or Fifth Amendment state-action requirement; 13 3 (2) whether the
Davis primary-purpose test has antecedents in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments; 134 and (3) how Crawford and Davis reflect the Court's
preference for objective evaluations. 135
Doing so clarifies our
understanding of the Court's developing formulation of what constitutes
testimonial hearsay.
A. "State Action" in the Sixth Amendment
At a basic level, the Bill of Rights reflects the concerns and views of
the Founders who wrote it. 13 6 As a whole, it was intended to protect the
people from government action, and not that of private individuals.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held long ago that the Fourth
Amendment is a restraint "upon the activities of sovereign authority,
and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies."' 137 Likewise, the same Court understood that the Fifth
Amendment protects citizens against government-compelled self138
incrimination.
As a result, it is now settled law that these various constitutional
protections apply only when government action is involved. 139 The
133. See infra Part 1Ml.A.
134. See infra Part M.B.
135. See infra Part m.C.
136. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment reflects the
view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights .... ").
137. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
138. Id. at 475-76.
139. See also Williams v. Nagel, 643 N.E.2d 816, 819 (111.1994) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment erects 'no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.' Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972). Therefore, in order to establish a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must
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Fourth Amendment only applies when there is "state action"; a search
140

by a private person does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.
Similarly, the Fifth Amendment only141protects against custodial

interrogation by law enforcement officers.

The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause expresses the Founders'

concern with the use of a certain type of out-of-court statement by the
government at trial, as exemplified by the case of Sir Walter Raleigh.
The CrawfordCourt's repeated emphasis on the Confrontation Clause's
concern regarding government involvement in the production of
testimonial hearsay is wholly consistent with the purpose and scope of
the Bill of Rights. Statements made among family or friends are not the
objects of the Confrontation Clause. 142
Understanding the
Confrontation Clause as protecting an individual defendant from the use
at trial of government-procured out-of-court statements in lieu of live
witness testimony comports with the overarching purpose of the Bill of
Rights.
B. Was the "PrimaryPurpose" Test Importedfrom the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments?
The Davis Court's formulation of testimonial hearsay based upon the
governmental agent's primary purpose 143 bears a striking resemblance
to aspects of the Court's understanding of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Indeed, Davis itself looked to cases interpreting those
Amendments. 14 4 Understanding that concept in these other, more

familiar arenas sheds light onto the meaning of "primary purpose"
within the Sixth Amendment context.

demonstrate that the conduct complained of is conduct by the State rather than conduct of a
private party." (quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948))).
140. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-15 (1984); People v. Phillips, 831 N.E.2d
574, 581 (111.2005).
141. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). See also, e.g., People v. Pankhurst,
848 N.E.2d 628, 636 (111.App. Ct. 2006) (stating that a school principal was not a state actor that
triggered Miranda requirements); People v. Fuller, 743 N.E.2d 1094, 1096-97 (1I1. App. Ct.
2001) (concluding that a store security guard was not a state actor, and consequently that Miranda
warnings were not required).
142. Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2692-93 (2008).
143. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); supra Part H.B (discussing the
Davis Court's emphasis on the government's purpose in obtaining out-of-court statements in
determining whether the statement is testimonial).
144. E.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 117 (2004)
(interpreting the Fourth Amendment); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (interpreting
the Fifth Amendment).
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1. Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court recently utilized a similar "primary purpose" test
in a Fourth Amendment 145 context. In Illinois v. Lidster, the Court
considered the constitutionality of an informational roadside
checkpoint. 14 6 Attempting to gather information about a previous fatal
hit-and-run incident, police set up a roadway checkpoint, stopping
motorists to ask whether they had any information about the accident.
During this procedure, the police arrested one driver for driving under
the influence of alcohol. At trial, the driver challenged the admissibility
of evidence utilized against him, claiming that the government
obtaining it via the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment.
Rejecting the defendant's arguments, the Court looked to the purpose
of the checkpoint. The Court deemed controlling that the
stop's primary law enforcementpurpose was not to determine whether
a vehicle's occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle
occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing
information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others. The
police expected the information elicited to help
them apprehend, not
1
the vehicle's occupants, but other individuals. 47
In other words, the roadblock's primary purpose was not to gather
evidence or make a case against anyone they stopped.
Thus, the Court looked to the primary purpose of the agents' actions
to determine whether they triggered the Fourth Amendment's
protection. This mirrors how the Court in Davis defined testimonial
hearsay triggering the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause:
testimonial hearsay is created when the circumstances objectively
indicate that the primary purpose of a police interrogation is to establish
past events for a later prosecution, but not when the primary purpose of
48
the questioning is to assist in an ongoing emergency. 1
Only a month before deciding Davis, the Court applied a similar
ongoing-emergency analysis within another Fourth Amendment
context: exigent circumstances. In Brigham City v. Stuart, it reaffirmed
that police may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency
145. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
146. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 421 (2004).
147. Id. at 423 (emphases omitted and added).
148. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
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assistance. 14 9 The Court observed that the "officers were confronted
with ongoing violence," 150 a theme that quickly resurfaced in the Davis
primary-purpose test.
This is also strikingly similar to how the "community caretaking"
function of the police relates to the Fourth Amendment. Community
caretaking refers to police action in performing a task unrelated to the
investigation of crime. In People v. Luedemann, the Illinois Supreme
Court recently engaged in a thorough and scholarly discussion of this

issue. 151
Luedemann traced the origin of the community caretaking doctrine
152
back to the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Cady v. Dombrowski.
In that case, the Court wrote that police officers often "engage in what,
for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking
functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
153
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."
When police obtain evidence during the course of the community
caretaking function, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment to use
that evidence at trial even though the officer lacked a warrant and
probable cause. 154 This is so precisely because the police officer's
conduct was "divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition
of evidence" of a crime; in other words, the officer's primary purpose
was not to investigate past events relevant to a later criminal
155
prosecution.
The reasoning behind Lidster, the ongoing-emergency analysis, and
community caretaking exception is entirely consistent with the Davis
Court's emphasis on the police officer's primary purpose in questioning
a declarant. Statements made to a police officer (even during an
"interrogation") when the primary purpose is not to "prove past events

149. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 406-07 (2006).
150. Id. at 405.
151. People v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187, 197-99 (111.2006).
152. Cady v. Drombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
153. Id. The Luedemann court listed examples of such conduct, including responding to heart
attack victims, helping children find their parents, helping inebriates find their way home,
responding to calls about missing person or sick neighbors, mediating noise disputes, responding
to calls about stray or injured animals, investigating premises left open at night, taking lost
property into their possession, and removing abandoned property. Luedenann, 857 N.E.2d at
197.
154. Cady, 413 U.S at 447-48.
155. Id. at 441. Cf Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2005) (holding that statements
"are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution").
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potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution" 156 -in other words,
non-testimonial hearsay-is remarkably analogous to characterizing the
police officer's primary purpose in asking questions as not for "the
detection, investigation, or acquisition
of evidence relating to the
15 7
violation of a criminal statute."

When the government actor's primary purpose is to investigate a
crime, (1) his search must comply with the Fourth Amendment to pass
constitutional muster, and (2) his questioning yields a testimonial
statement triggering Sixth Amendment protection at trial. In both
analyses, the inquiry focuses upon the primary purpose of the
government actor in obtaining the evidence. When the agent's primary
purpose is something other than investigating a crime "with an eye
toward trial," 158 the action does not trigger these constitutional
concerns.
2. Fifth Amendment
The Supreme Court engaged in a similar analysis within a Fifth
Amendment 1 59 context a full twenty years before deciding Crawford.
In New York v. Quarles, the Court recognized the existence of a "public
safety" exception to the Miranda requirements. 160 In Quarles, a woman
told police officers on road patrol that she had been raped by a man
carrying a gun who had just entered a grocery store. 161 The police
chased the man through the store, caught him, patted him down, and
found an empty shoulder holster. After placing him in custody, an
officer asked the defendant where the gun was. He nodded in the
direction of some empty cartons and responded, "the gun is over
there." 162 Only after finding the loaded gun did the police give the
63
Miranda warnings.1
The Court observed that this was "a situation in which police officers
ask[ed] questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety."' 164 The Court deemed it important that the police officer
"needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against
156. Davis, 547 U.S.. at 822.
157.

158.
159.
witness
160.
161.
162.

Cady, 413 U.S. at 441.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
against himself.").
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
Id. at651-52.
Id. at 652.

163. Id.
164. Id. at 656-57.
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[defendant] but to insure that further danger to the public did not result
from the concealment of the gun in a public area." 16 5 The Court then
concluded that this "need for answers to questions in a situation posing
a threat to the public safety" removed this admittedly custodial
166
interrogation from the ambit of Miranda'srequirements.
The core of this analysis is similarly reflected in the Davis primarypurpose test. The Quarles decision was based upon the officer's
motivation in asking the questions, much as the Court in Davis
examined the officer's primary purpose to determine whether
statements constituted testimonial hearsay. 16 7 In addition, Quarles's
foundation is the importance of resolving an ongoing threat to public
safety. The Davis Court similarly concluded that a declarant's
statements are non-testimonial when they are elicited "to resolve [a]
present emergency."' 16 8 When the primary purpose of a police officer's
questions is to address an emergency situation, admitting the statements
at trial offends neither the Fifth nor Sixth Amendments.
It was surely no slip of the tongue that Davis specifically cited
Quarles in discussing how trial courts will recognize when a statement
169
becomes testimonial.
C. Objective Tests and Bright Lines
So why is any of the Court's Fourth and Fifth Amendment precedent
significant to understanding
the new Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence? It is important because in these areas, the Supreme
Court has demonstrated its preference for objective assessments.
' 170 Crawford
Lamenting that "[v]ague standards are manipulable,"
created its new testimonial-hearsay paradigm specifically to reject its
prior "amorphous, if not entirely subjective" 17 1 reliability-based
standard, articulated in Ohio v. Roberts.172 Once again, the Court
rejected an old subjective test.
The Supreme Court shuns subjective inquiries. As a result, the
testimonial-hearsay doctrine established by Crawford is instead based
upon objective assessments, the same analysis the Court has proclaimed
165. Id. at 657.
166. Id.
167. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 827-28 (2005).
168. Id. at 827. This also mirrors the Court's thinking in the Fourth Amendment contexts
noted above. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); supra Part III.B.I.
169. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829.
170. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
171. Id. at63.
172. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
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time and time again in Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts. Davis
advances this theme, repeatedly stating that its primary-purpose test
rests upon an evaluation of circumstances objectively indicating the
173
primary purpose of the police officer's conduct.
Quarles174 demonstrated this preference in the Fifth Amendment
context. In Quarles, the Court rejected a subjective test to determine
whether the police officer's actions triggered Miranda requirements,
holding that "the availability of that exception does not depend upon the
motivation of the individuals involved."' 175 The Court instead employed
an objective test, determining that statements arising from such a
"kaleidoscopic [emergency] situation" 17 6 should be evaluated in the
context of "a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably
prompted by a concern for the public safety."' 177 Neither the officer's
nor the declarant's subjective motivation for the statements is relevant.
Instead, it is an objective assessment of the circumstances in which a
statement is made that controls the ultimate determination of the
statement's constitutional status.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court construed what constitutes
interrogation in a Miranda context. 178 In doing so, it focused on
objective factors, holding that interrogation includes words or actions
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. 17 9 The Davis Court's focus on objective
circumstances used to evaluate a police officer's primary purpose in
speaking with a declarant is similar to the Innis Court's reliance on an
objective evaluation of an officer's interrogation of a suspect.
In Stansbury v. California, the Court addressed the proper analysis
for determining whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda
purposes. 180 In doing so, the Court held that its "decisions make clear
that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored
by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.' 8 1
Recently, in People v. Slater, the Illinois Supreme Court cited Stansbury
173. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Davis primary-purpose test).
174. Note again it was surely no accident that Davis cited Quarles. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829.
See supra Part Im.B.2.
175. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
176. Id.

177. Id.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-02 (1980).
Id. at 301.
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1994).
Id. at 323.
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and, in a thorough discussion, reaffirmed that whether a person is in
custody for Miranda purposes is an objective determination based upon
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 182
Throughout
Quarles, Innis, and Stansbury, the Court repeatedly relied upon
objective assessments over subjective ones in applying the Fifth
Amendment.
The Court invoked the same preference for objective inquiries in
various Fourth Amendment contexts. In Whren v. United States, the it
reaffirmed that reviewing the reasonableness of a police officer's
183
conduct is solely an objective inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.
Refusing to evaluate reasonableness by considering the officer's actual
motivations, the Court repudiated the defendant's argument seeking to
include the officer's subjective motivations as a factor in the greater
objective analysis. The Court went further, concluding that even an
officer's actually improper (or pretextual) purpose does not invalidate
an otherwise objectively reasonable action. 184 This preference for clear,
objective assessments is woven throughout the Davis's formulation of
testimonial hearsay.
Reconfirming this commitment to objective analyses, the Court in
Stuart explored exigent circumstances permitting an officer to enter a
residence without a warrant. The Utah Supreme Court had held that
purported exigent circumstances may not be primarily motivated by an
actual intent to arrest and seize evidencel 85-a colorable construction of
the similarly phrased Davis primary purpose test. The United Stats
Supreme Court emphatically reversed the Utah court, noting its repeated
holdings that an officer's conduct is reasonable as long as the
circumstances objectively justify the action, regardless of the officer's
186
subjective state of mind.
In Davis, decided only a month later, the Court required an objective
evaluation of the officer's primary purpose in speaking with a declarant
to determine a statement's testimonial status. 187 In both situations it
182. People v. Slater, 886 N.E.2d 986, 994-96 (I11.2008).
183. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").
184. Id. at 812,814-15.
185. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006).
186. Id. at 403.
187. In Davis, the Court held:
Statements are non[-]testimonial . . . under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that...
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.
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relied upon an objective review of the facts, eschewing dependence
upon the individual officer's subjective motivation, understanding, or
intent. In its analysis, the Stuart Court noted at least one problem with
relying upon police officers' subjective interpretations of a situation: the
unlikelihood that "their subjective motives could be so neatly
unraveled."' 188 This same difficulty lies in examining an officer's
primary purpose in speaking with a declarant to determine whether her
statement constitutes testimonial hearsay.
In Cady, the Court articulated its community caretaking doctrine 189
by
describing police activities distinct from the investigation of a crime.
The Stuart Court noted that the "role of a peace officer includes
preventing violence and restoring order," 190 language notably similar to
the Court's definition of community caretaking. Surely police action to
resolve an ongoing emergency comport with these concepts. Viewing
Davis's primary purpose test with these concepts in mind brings
familiar principles and helpful clarity to understanding testimonial
hearsay.
D. Conclusion: Related PrecedentFurtherExplains Testimonial
Hearsay
Many concepts borne in Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence
have found renewed life in the Court's new understanding of the
Confrontation Clause. The protections embodied in the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments are aimed at government action, a theme that
resonates throughout Crawford. Objectively assessing a police officer's
primary motivation and purpose is a familiar exercise in many Fourth
and Fifth Amendment contexts. Applying the Davis primary-purpose
test should be no different. The Court has been clear: vague and
manipulable, subjective tests in these contexts must give way to
objective assessments.
These familiar objective analyses provide both a workable practice in
addressing everyday Confrontation Clause issues as well as insight into
how the Court's understanding of the Clause continues to develop.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2005) (emphasis added). Examining the facts in Davis,
the Court concluded that the circumstances of the conversation "objectively indicat[ed] its
primary purpose" were to deal with an emergency. Id. at 828. Turning to the companion case
Hammon v. Indiana, the Court concluded that the statement was testimonial because,
"[o]bjectively viewed, the primary... purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible
crime." Id. at 830.
188. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 405.
189. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
190. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 406.
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IV. WHAT IT ALL MEANS

Crawford represents a seismic change in how courts evaluate
confrontation issues every day. Four centuries after the trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh, the Supreme Court looked back to that experience to
understand the meaning of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
Rallying against both the abuses that doomed Sir Walter Raleigh and
the ambiguities and manipulability of its previous analysis, the
Crawford Confrontation Clause is now tightly focused against the use
of formalized, ex parte statements in lieu of live witness testimony at
trial-the newly identified testimonial hearsay.
Crawford teaches that testimonial hearsay is a particular type of
statement, one typically obtained by a governmental agent in a formal
environment. An accuser making a formal statement to a governmental
investigator bears testimony in a way that a person making a casual
remark to an acquaintance does not. A person simply does not testify to
family, friends, or others who are not governmental actors investigating
a crime and gathering evidence for possible prosecution.
Additionally, a statement's testimonial status is determined by the
context in which it was made rather than by its particular content.
Crawford's recognition that testimonial hearsay contemplates formal
statements is furthered by the Davis Court's understanding of the
formality inherently present or absent in various contexts. Just as no
victim goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek aid, a
declarant's statement to police to assist them in resolving an ongoing
emergency lacks the requisite formality inherent in testimonial hearsay.
Instead, testimonial hearsay contemplates statements made to police in
the more formal context of investigating a possible crime for subsequent
prosecution. Cases suggesting that certain words or subjects within
otherwise non-testimonial hearsay, ipso facto constitute testimonial
hearsay conflict with the Supreme Court's holdings in Crawford,Davis,
and Giles.
Through Crawford and Davis, the Court grafted into the
Confrontation Clause concepts familiar in its Fourth and Fifth
Amendment cases. The "state action" requirement in Fourth and Fifth
Amendment contexts resonates throughout Crawford. Assessing a
police officer's primary purpose for his actions within Fourth and Fifth
Amendment challenges is strikingly reflected in the Davis primarypurpose test for testimonial hearsay. And the Court's clear preference
for objective assessments, rather than manipulable and vague subjective
tests, is a common thread now woven throughout its Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendment case law.
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After Crawford, some practitioners cried that the judicial sky had
fallen and feared (or exulted over) the end of criminal trials as we know
them.
Careful review, however, shows that this confrontation
revolution ultimately embodies familiar concepts.
Utilizing these
familiar concepts, the Supreme Court's new structure for analyzing
confrontation issues should provide clarity for the bench and bar.

